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Abstract
We provide experimental evidence that under strong beauty contest incentives,
players ignore signals from an information source with high content if the source has
low clarity. Instead, they acquire equally costly signals from a source with higher clar-
ity despite its lower content. Content measures how precisely an information source
identifies an economic situation, whereas clarity measures how precisely the source
content is commonly interpreted. Low clarity impairs players’ ability to coordinate.
When signals are provided exogenously, our experimental results are less severe than
theoretical predictions, but consistent with level-2 reasoning in a cognitive behavioral
model. When players acquire signals endogenously, ignoring a high-content source is
more severe than theoretical predictions. Our results imply that when beauty contest
incentives are strong (e.g., short-horizon trading), investors can completely ignore a
firm’s disclosure, despite its high content, if the disclosure is not sufficiently clear.
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1 Introduction
When making decisions, investors often have access to multiple sources of information. They can
access detailed financial statements, analyst reports, and brief company news in the media. There
is evidence that sometimes investors ignore information sources with high content such as financial
reports, and instead pay a lot of attention to sources with low content such as news briefs by the
media. For example, Niantic, a U.S. software company, released a mobile game, “Pokemon Go,”
on July 6, 2016. The share price of Nintendo, a Japanese company that has little relationship
with the game, rose more than 120% after the release of Pokemon Go. Investors mistakenly
believed that Nintendo owned and thus benefited from the popularity of the game because the
cartoon character Pokemon first appeared in a video game developed by Nintendo. Although
Nintendo’s financial statements indicated that the company did not make or own Pokemon Go,
the market reaction suggests that investors ignored that information. On the other hand, Mad
Money, the popular CNBC show, receives a lot of attention from retail investors and generates
significant market reactions despite the fact that stock analyses by Jim Cramer, the show’s host,
are very brief and offer no additional information beyond that which is publicly available.1 Why
do investors ignore information with high content (financial statements), but pay attention to
information with low content (Cramer’s show)?
In this paper, we propose that beauty contest incentives can lead agents to ignore an informa-
tion source with high content and instead pay attention to a source with low content.2 As John
Keyenes said almost a century ago, “stock picking is like a beauty contest.” An investor picks a
company’s stock not only because the fundamentals look promising but also because the investor
wants to choose what other investors find attractive. As such, when beauty contest incentives
are present, investors want to acquire information not only about the economic fundamentals but
1Engelberg et al. (2012) report that stocks recommended by Cramer experience very high trading
activities, and generate above 2.4% abnormal overnight returns. These recommendations do not appear
to be informative in the long run because the overnight returns subsequently reverse after a few months.
2Agents’ have beauty contest incentives when they want to “do what others do.” The (Keynesian)
beauty contest is characterized by strategic complementarities in agents’ decision rules; i.e., the marginal
payoffs for an individual agent’s action increases with the average action of all other agents.
1
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3152537 
also about other investors’ likely actions. Apart from the content of an information source, the
clarity of that source plays a critical role in investors’ information acquisition decisions. Content
of a source determines how precisely the source identifies the economic fundamentals, whereas
clarity determines how precisely the source content is commonly interpreted. An information
source with higher clarity is similarly interpreted, and therefore more useful in predicting others’
likely actions. If beauty contest incentives are sufficiently strong, investors’ incentive to acquire
commonly interpreted information dominates their incentive to learn about the fundamentals—
i.e., clarity trumps content. As such, investors pay more attention to a high-clarity information
source despite its low content, and ignore a low-clarity source despite its high content. Myatt and
Wallace (2012) derive this insight in a beauty contest model. We construct a discrete information
choice version of Myatt and Wallace (2012) and test this key insight in laboratory experiments.
In the extant literature, investors’ information acquisition (attention) behavior is explained by
individual investor’s information processing costs. An investor tends to ignore financial statements
but pays attention to Cramer’s brief stock analyses because the former are harder to process
than the latter. However, this intuition is incomplete because an investor has no reason to ignore
financial statements with high information content if the benefit from higher content is greater
than the processing costs. The strategic perspective raised by Myatt and Wallace (2012) can
explain why investors rationally ignore information with high content and instead pay attention
to low-content information. This perspective emphasizes that when players have strong incentive
to coordinate with others, source clarity plays a more important role than source content in
players’ information acquisition decisions. Although companies’ financial statements have more
content because of their details, they often lack clarity because investors may focus on different
parts of the statements and draw different interpretations.3 In contrast, Jim Cramer’s stock
recommendations may have lower content, but they have greater clarity because they are concise
and simple, and thus more likely to be commonly interpreted.
3Investors, firms, practitioners, and regulators are concerned that corporate disclosures have become
longer and increasingly complex to navigate (KPMG, 2011; Monga and Chasan, 2015). To improve the
clarity of financial statements, the SEC has taken several initiatives including the “plain English” rule
(1998), and the more recent FAST ACT (2015).
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We illustrate investors’ information acquisition behavior by constructing a beauty contest
model (Morris and Shin, 2002) similar to Myatt and Wallace (2012) but with discrete informa-
tion choice and finite number of agents. Prior literature (Allen et al., 2006; Gao, 2008) has shown
that a trading model with short-horizon traders has the features of a beauty contest model in
which the incentive to match the action of others (strategic complementarity) emerges endoge-
nously. Allowing players to acquire information from multiple sources before the beauty contest
stage, Myatt and Wallace (2012) derive the theoretical insight that information sources which
receive attention are the clearest possible even though they have low content. With continuous
information acquisition choice in Myatt and Wallace (2012), the overall clarity of a signal is en-
dogenous and the information acquisition equilibrium is unique. With discrete information choice
in our model, signal clarity is exogenous and multiple acquisition equilibria emerge under certain
parameter sets. We extend Myatt and Wallace by including players’ limited order of beliefs in
a cognitive behavioral model (e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Nagel, 1995) in both beauty contest
and information acquisition stages.
In our model, two players simultaneously decide whether to acquire signals from two informa-
tion sources at a cost before the beauty contest game. Each information source generates signals
with two noise components: a common noise shared among all players, and an idiosyncratic noise
unique to each player. The common noise may arise because a source generates information
about the economic fundamentals with error. An information source with higher content has
common noise with a smaller variance. The idiosyncratic noise may arise because players have
different interpretations of the signal with common noise. An information source with higher
clarity results in idiosyncratic noises with a smaller variance.4 A unique feature of our setup is
that we keep the total variance of (a signal from) each source the same, but vary the level of
content and clarity. One information source has high content and low clarity, and the other has
low content and high clarity. Although both information sources generate equally costly signals
4Liang and Zhang (2014) show that this information structure endogenously arises in a measurement
system with managerial discretion and aggregation. They refer to the precision of common error as
“accuracy” and the precision of idiosyncratic error as “objectivity.” Similar information (exogenous)
structures have been used in Indjejikian (1991), Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) and Kim and Verrecchia
(1994).
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and are equally useful in reducing the fundamental uncertainty, the source with higher clarity is
more useful in predicting others’ actions and as such, reducing the strategic uncertainty.
When information is provided exogenously, our model predicts that in the absence of beauty
contest incentives, players assign equal weight to signals from both information sources. However,
when there are incentives to coordinate, players assign more weight to a signal from the high-
clarity and low-content source. When players acquire information endogenously, our three main
predictions are: (i) the likelihood of a player acquiring a signal from a low-clarity and high-content
source increases with her opponent acquiring the same signal (complementarity in information
acquisition); (ii) when information acquisition costs are high, strong beauty contest incentives lead
players to acquire information only from the high-clarity source, and ignore the source with lower
clarity despite its higher content; and (iii) when information acquisition costs are low, players
acquire information from both information sources, but they assign more weight to information
with higher clarity and lower content.
While these predictions are stark, one wonders whether they are supported by empirical evi-
dence, as the predictions require strong assumptions on players’ ability to process an infinite level
of high-order beliefs to coordinate. It is unclear whether our prediction that information with
high content is completely ignored if it has low clarity holds in reality. In archival data, players’
private information acquisition decisions are unobservable, which makes it difficult to identify the
effect of coordination on information acquisition. Thus, we test our theoretical predictions in con-
trolled laboratory experiments, in which we can observe players’ private information acquisition
decisions, and manipulate the degree of strategic complementarity and the cost of information.
Our experiments employ a 2X2 between-subjects design by manipulating the strength of
complementarity and the cost of information. We find experimental evidence of complementarity
in information acquisition. Under endogenous information acquisition, our experimental results
confirm that information with high content and low clarity is ignored at high information costs.
However, contrary to our theoretical predictions, information with high content is ignored also
when information costs are low. Additionally, we find that with exogenous information, the
underweighting of information with high content and low clarity is less severe than theoretical
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predictions based on an infinite level of high-order beliefs but consistent with level-2 reasoning
in a cognitive behavioral model. This finding suggests that compared to equilibrium predictions,
subjects overuse information with high content and low clarity. The overuse of such information
at the beauty contest stage creates an endogenous cost at the information acquisition stage by
driving players’ actions further away from each other, and thereby reducing their payoffs. This
endogenous cost of acquiring information with high content makes it rational for players to ignore
such information even when the exogenous cost of information acquisition is low.
Our paper contributes to the emerging accounting literature that explores how strategic com-
plementarity affects disclosure choices. Assuming exogenous information, prior literature primar-
ily focuses on the insight from Morris and Shin (2002) that beauty contest incentives lead agents
to put greater weight on information that is more public in nature. This effect underlies the
findings in Gao (2008) and Chen et al. (2014) in the context of short-horizon trading, Arya and
Mittendorf (2016) and Chen et al. (2017) in the context of investment complementarities, and
Anctil et al. (2004), Banerjee and Maier (2016), Qu (2013), and Liang and Zhang (2014) in the
context of bank runs. We are the first to introduce the insight of Myatt and Wallace (2012) with
endogenous information acquisition. Most importantly, we are the first to provide experimental
evidence on the key implication of the model.
Our study is among the first to experimentally test complementarity in information acquisi-
tion. In a two-period model with short-horizon traders, Chamley (2007) establishes the existence
of strategic complementarity in the acquisition of traders’ private information. In a generic model
of beauty contest, Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) show that agents’ information choices exhibit
complementarity in the presence of strategic complementarity: if an agent wants to do what
others do, she wants to know what others know. Our study contributes to this literature by
providing experimental evidence of complementarity in information acquisition.5
Our findings offer very different policy implications from prior literature on the role of the
5Szkup and Trevino (2012) study endogenous information acquisition in a global game of speculative
attack. They find that although most subjects play the predicted equilibrium in the information acquisition
stage, subjects’ action choices in the coordination stage deviate from the theoretical predictions. The
authors focus their analysis on the observed deviation behavior in the coordination stage. We find subjects’
deviation behavior in both the coordination (beauty contest) and information acquisition stages.
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public nature of information in beauty contests. With exogenous information, prior research finds
that over-weighting of public information in laboratory experiments is less severe than theoretical
predictions (e.g., Cornand and Heinemann, 2014; Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2016). While theory
imposes the assumption of infinite level of reasoning, experimental evidence indicates that sub-
jects’ behavior is more consistent with level-2 reasoning. Using a theoretical model, Cornand
and Heinemann (2015) show that the counterintuitive result that increased transparency reduces
social welfare in Morris and Shin (2002) no longer holds if we assume agents’ limited levels of
reasoning. Thus, prior research implies that the distortion in the use of public information under
beauty contest incentives may not be a serious concern. Our paper shows that this policy implica-
tion is no longer valid when information is endogenous. Our experimental evidence suggests that
the publicity of information matters even more than theoretical predictions. Players completely
ignore information with high content and low clarity even when theory predicts that they do
not. Such ignoring can result in significant distortions in capital market efficiency when beauty
contest incentives are strong (e.g., short-horizon trading). Moreover, the flip side is that investors
may systematically gravitate toward high-clarity but low-content information. Rumors or even
sunspot events with high clarity may drive prices, whereas the impact of corporate disclosures on
market prices diminishes.
The strategic effect of beauty contest incentives on information acquisition offers a new per-
spective to understand market reactions to accounting disclosure. Prior research suggests that
information disclosed in footnotes has less market impact than information recognized in finan-
cial statements (e.g., Aboody, 1996; Davis-Friday et al., 1999; Ahmed et al., 2006). Past research
emphasizes the individual perspective of information processing suggesting that the difference in
impact could be due to investors’ cognitive biases or differences in processing costs (Schipper,
2007). Our study offers a strategic perspective to explaining this empirical regularity by em-
phasizing individual beliefs about others’ behavior. Footnote disclosures may contain a lot of
detail but often lack clarity.6 When beauty contest incentives are strong, investors may underuse
6Morris and Shin (2007) suggest that accounting standards on recognition provide a common rule
for investors to interpret recognized numbers, thereby enhancing their clarity. In contrast, there are no
common standards for footnote disclosure (e.g., Schipper, 2007), and investors’ interpretation of footnote
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or even completely ignore footnote disclosures because they believe other investors most likely
do the same. Beauty contest incentives are stronger when there are more transient institutional
investors who speculate on short-term price changes (e.g., Sapra, 2010). A testable empirical
prediction based on our findings is that market under-reaction to footnote disclosure is greater
for firms with more transient institutional investors.
2 Theory and Predictions
We consider a quadratic beauty-contest game with two players, i and j. Players’ payoffs depend
on the closeness of their actions to an unobserved economic fundamental (θ) and to each other’s
actions (ai and aj). Player i’s utility function is
ui
(
ai, aj , θ
)
= u¯− (1− r)(ai − θ)2 − r(ai − aj)2, (1)
where r ∈ (0, 1) is a complementarity parameter. There are two stages of the game. In the first
stage, players simultaneously decide to acquire (i.e., pay attention to) signals from two information
sources by paying a cost. In the second stage, having observed their own private signals, as well
as other players’ information acquisition decisions (but not their signal realizations), players play
the beauty contest game.
Players have a common prior about the fundamental, θ ∼ N(θ¯, σ2θ). Each player i has access
to two real-valued signals xiA and x
i
B. The signals
xiA = θ + ηA + ε
i
A and
xiB = θ + ηB + ε
i
B (2)
contain noise terms ηA ∼ N(0, α2A), ηB ∼ N(0, α2B) and εiA ∼ N(0, κ2A), εiB ∼ N(0, κ2B) that are
mutually independently distributed. Signal xiA (player i’s signal A) is generated by information
source A and signal xiB (player i’s signal B) is generated by information source B. A player’s
disclosure can vary a lot among individuals.
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choice to acquire a signal from a source A is represented by ziA = 1, and the choice to not acquire
by ziA = 0. The cost of information acquisition from sources A and B is C(z
i
A, z
i
B).
The noise in each signal xiA has two components: a common noise ηA and an idiosyncratic
noise εiA, which is different for each player. The common noise reflects the “sender” noise, or
the noise from an information source. The idiosyncratic noise reflects the “receiver” noise, or the
noise generated by the receiver’s interpretation of the common signal xA ≡ θ+ηA. The content of
an information source is defined as the precision of the common noise; i.e., 1/α2A. The clarity of
an information source is the precision of the idiosyncratic noise; i.e., 1/κ2A.
7 Loosely, the content
is the level of detail an information source provides about the fundamental, whereas the clarity
is how easily the source content is commonly interpreted (understood) by the players.
A source with higher clarity generates signals with more correlated noises, and thus, helps
players coordinate better with each other. To see this, note that for any source A, the conditional
correlation between players’ signals is
ρA ≡ Corr(xiA, xjA|θ) =
1/κ2A
1/α2A + 1/κ
2
A
.
The correlation increases with clarity, but decreases with the content of a source. The intuition is
that as clarity increases, the variation of the idiosyncratic noise decreases, and thus, the variation
of a signal is primarily driven by the variation of the common noise.
The information structure assumed here is similar to Myatt and Wallace (2012) but with
discrete information choice and finite number of agents. This structure blurs the traditional
distinction between the public and private signals in the beauty contest literature (e.g., Morris
and Shin, 2002). On the one hand, a signal with imperfect content but perfect clarity is a “pure
public” signal—i.e., as κA → 0, ρA → 1. On the other hand, a signal with perfect content
but imperfect clarity is a “pure private” signal—i.e., as αA → 0, ρA → 0. In our information
structure, each signal is characterized not only by its variance, but also by its cross-sectional
correlation among the players. As such, intermediate values of “publicity” are admissible in this
7The precision of the common noise is called “accuracy” in Myatt and Wallace (2012). The precision
of the idiosyncratic noise is called “transparency” in Pavan (2014).
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information structure by allowing a general correlation structure.
2.1 Signal Weights
In this section, we take players’ information acquisition decisions as given, and derive the equilib-
rium weights on each signal in their optimal action choices in the beauty contest game. We allow
players to play asymmetric strategies in both coordination and information acquisition stages.
Optimality requires that a player’s action satisfies
ai = (1− r)Ei [θ] + rEi [aj] , (3)
where the expectation operator Ei [.] ≡ E [.|Ii], and Ii denotes the information set of player
i. We focus on a linear (but not necessarily symmetric) equilibrium. Suppose that each player
follows the following linear action strategy:
ai = θ¯ + ωiA(x
i
A − θ¯) + ωiB(xiB − θ¯) (4)
aj = θ¯ + ωjA(x
j
A − θ¯) + ωjB(xjB − θ¯), (5)
where a signal weight ωiA > 0 if z
i
A = 1 and ω
i
A = 0 if z
i
A = 0. The weight on the prior θ for
player i is ωi0 ≡ 1− ωiA − ωiB.
To derive equilibrium signal weights, we take players’ information acquisition choices as given.
For brevity of notation, we denote players’ information choice profile as ab(cd) for any a, b, c, d ∈
{1, 0} such that ziA = a, ziB = b, zjA = c, and zjB = d. Here, we derive equilibrium signal
weights for an asymmetric information choice profile 11(10), in which player i acquires signals
from both sources, but player j acquires a signal from only source A. An example of the derivation
of equilibrium weights for a symmetric information choice profile is shown in the appendix.
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By (4) and (5), players’ actions, for the information choice profile 11(10), are
ai = θ¯ + ωiA
(
xiA − θ¯
)
+ ωiB
(
xiB − θ¯
)
(6)
aj = θ¯ + ωjA
(
xjA − θ¯
)
. (7)
By the optimality condition (3) of player i, ai = (1−r)E [θ|xiA, xiB]+rE [aj |xiA, xiB], which, after
replacing the value of aj from (7), yields
ai = (1− r)E [θ|xiA, xiB]+ rE [θ¯ + ωˆjA (xjA − θ¯) |xiA, xiB] , (8)
where ωˆjA is player i’s conjecture about player j’s weight on signal A. Replacing the values
of E
[
θ|xiA, xiB
]
and E
[
(xjA − θ¯)|xiA, xiB
]
in (8), and comparing the coefficients of
(
xiA − θ¯
)
and(
xiB − θ¯
)
with (6), we have
ωiA =
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
D
+
[
r
{
α2A
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ σ2θ
(
α2A + α
2
B + κ
2
B
)}
D
]
ωˆjA (9)
ωiB =
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
D
+
(
rκ2Aσ
2
θ
D
)
ωˆjA, (10)
where D ≡ (α2A + κ2A) (α2B + κ2B)+ σ2θ (α2A + κ2A + α2B + κ2B) .
Using an analogous argument, player j’s optimal action is
aj = (1− r)E
[
θ|xjA
]
+ rE
[
θ¯ + ωˆiA
(
xiA − θ¯
)
+ ωˆiB
(
xiB − θ¯
) |xjA] , (11)
where ωˆiA and ωˆ
i
B are player j’s conjecture about player i’s weights on signals A and B. Substitut-
ing the values of E
[
θ|xjA
]
, E
[
(xiA − θ¯)|xjA
]
, and E
[
θ|xjA
]
in (11), and comparing the coefficient
of
(
xjA − θ¯
)
with (7), we have
ωjA =
(1− r)σ2θ + r
(
σ2θ + α
2
A
)
ωˆiA + rσ
2
θ ωˆ
i
B
σ2θ + α
2
A + κ
2
A
. (12)
In equilibrium, ωˆln = ω
l
n for any l ∈ {i, j} and any n ∈ {A,B}. Replacing the values of ωiA
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and ωiB from (9) and (10) in (12), we have ω
j
A =
M
N , where
M ≡ (1− r)σ2θ
[{
(1 + r)α2A + κ
2
A
} (
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ (1 + r)σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A + α
2
B + κ
2
B
)]
N ≡ (σ2θ + α2A + κ2A)D − r2 (σ2θ + α2A) [α2A (α2B + κ2B)+ σ2θ (α2A + α2B + κ2B)]− r2κ2Aσ4θ .
Values of weights ωiA and ω
i
B are obtained from (9) and (10) by substituting the value of ω
j
A.
2.2 Information Acquisition
Having derived equilibrium signal weights, we now work backwards to calculate player’s optimal
information acquisition choices. Each player decides whether to acquire or not acquire a signal
from sources A and B to maximize his ex-ante expected utility. A players’ ex-ante expected
utility given equilibrium weights, and the cost of information acquisition is given by
U i = u¯− Li − C (ziA, ziB) , (13)
where the expected losses (see the derivation in the appendix) are
Li
(
σ2θ , α
2
n, κ
2
n
)
= (1− r)E [(ai − θ)2]+ rE [(ai − aj)2]
=
[
(1− r) (ωi0)2 + r (ωi0 − ωj0)2]σ2θ+∑
n=A,B
[
(1− r) (ωin)2 + r (ωin − ωjn)2]α2n+
∑
n=A,B
[
(1− r) (ωin)2 + r{(ωin)2 + (ωjn)2}]κ2n. (14)
For any information choice profile ab(cd), we denote a player’s expected utility by U iab(cd),
and expected losses as Liab (cd) . We also denote expected benefits from acquiring one or both
11
signals by
Bi1′b (cd) ≡ Li0b (cd)− Li1b (cd)
Bia1′ (cd) ≡ Lia0 (cd)− Lia1 (cd)
Bi11 (cd) ≡ Li00 (cd)− Li11 (cd) .
For example, Bi1′0 (11) = L
i
00 (11) − Li10 (11) denotes player i’s expected benefits from acquiring
a signal from source A (note the “′” on first “1”) given that he does not acquire a signal from
source B, and player j acquires signals from both sources.
We derive two main results. First, strategic complementarity in action choices leads to strate-
gic complementarity in information acquisition decisions. That is, if a player wants to do what
others do, then he wants to know what others know. This result is reminiscent of Hellwig and
Veldkamp (2009), albeit with a different information structure. Second, signals from the source
with higher clarity are acquired in a greater range of parameter sets than those from the source
with lower clarity, even though the latter source has higher content. Multiple equilibria in players’
information acquisition choices resurface because unlike in Myatt and Wallace (2012), players’
acquisition decisions in our model are discrete. We use a numerical simulation to derive these
results.
Choice of parameter values. To conduct a horse race of content versus clarity, we make the
total variance of each source the same, and vary their contents and clarifies. Source A has higher
clarity, but lower content, whereas source B has lower clarity but higher content. The total
variance (conditional on θ) of each source is the same; i.e., α2A + κ
2
A = α
2
B + κ
2
B. To examine
the differential impact of content and clarity, we manipulate the complementarity and cost of
information parameters. For the complementarity parameter r, we choose one high (r = 0.8) and
one low (r = 0.2) value. The cost parameter c measures the amount a player pays to receive
a signal from a source. Since both sources have the same total variance, players pay the same
cost for a signal from each source. We choose one high (c = 200) and one low (c = 5) value to
ensure separation of players’ behaviors. The variance of the prior distribution is chosen to be high
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(σ2θ = 200) to minimize its impact—and maximize the impact of the two information sources—on
players’ equilibrium behaviors. The complete set of parameter values are:
θ¯ = 500, σθ = 200, αA = κB = 30, αB = κA = 5, r ∈ {0.2, 0.8}, c ∈ {5, 200}, u¯ = 3000. (15)
In result 1, we compare players’ expected benefits with the costs of acquiring one or both
signals. Players benefit from acquiring a signal that the other players also acquire, because
knowing what others know help them coordinate better with each others’ action choices. We
show that a player’s net expected benefits are higher when the other player also acquires the
same signal(s).
Result 1 (Complementarity in information acquisition). For a positive value of strategic comple-
mentarity, a player’s expected benefits of acquiring a signal from an information source increase
when the other player also acquires the signal from the same source. Given the parameter values
in (15), the following inequalities hold
i) Bi1′0 (10) > B
i
1′0 (00) ; B
i
01′ (01) > B
i
01′ (00) ; B
i
11 (11) > B
i
11 (00)
ii) Bi1′1 (11) > B
i
1′1 (01) ; B
i
11′ (11) > B
i
11′ (10) .
Table 1 presents the values of expected benefits for complementarity parameter values, r ∈
{0, 0.2, 0.8}. Expected benefits satisfy inequalities in Result 1 at r = 0.2 and r = 0.8, but not at
r = 0.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
In result 2, we characterizes all information acquisition equilibria for any value of the cost
parameter c ∈ (0,∞), and parameter values in (15), and r = 0.8. While our focus is on the
two values of cost parameter (i.e., c = 5 and c = 200), we characterize equilibria for all values
of c in order to have a comprehensive understanding of how information cost affects an agent’s
13
information acquisition decisions.8
Result 2 (Information acquisition equilibria). If r = 0.8, c ∈ (0,∞), and rest of the parameters
follow (15), then
i) acquiring both signals is the unique equilibrium if c < 22
ii) 2 equilibria—acquiring only signal A and acquiring both signals—exist if 22 6 c 6 32
iii) acquiring only signal A is the unique equilibrium if 32 < c 6 345
iv) 2 equilibria—acquiring only signal A and acquiring only signal B—exist if 345 < c 6 1564
v) 3 equilibria—acquiring only signal A, acquiring only signal B, and acquiring no signal—exist
if 1564 < c 6 7857
vi) 2 equilibria—acquiring only signal A and acquiring no signal—exist if 7857 < c 6 9032
vii) acquiring no signal is the unique equilibrium if c > 9032.
Two points regarding Result 2 are noteworthy. One, with the exception of the highest cost
range (c > 9032), acquiring signal A is always part of the set of equilibria. This is because
signal A has higher clarity than signal B, even though A has lower content than B. Two, while
we allow for asymmetric strategies for the players—in both the beauty contest and information
acquisition stages—equilibria are always symmetric because of strategic complementarity. In
the next section, we exploit the properties of these two results in greater detail to develop our
hypotheses.
2.3 Hypotheses
We derive 5 hypotheses based on the parameter values stated in (15). Hypotheses 1-2 concern
the use of signals in players’ actions choices. Hypotheses 3-5 concern the acquisition of signals
8To save space, we do not show all the equilibria for r = 0.2. Equilibria are similar to Result 2,
but ranges of cost parameter differ. For example, acquiring both signals is the unique equilibrium if
c < 290, and acquiring no signal is the unique equilibrium if c > 36271. Other equilibria exist within
c ∈ [290, 36271].
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from the 2 information sources.
Hypothesis 1 (Clarity versus content). Players place more weight on signal A than B in their
action choices.
Hypothesis 2 (Complementarity and signal weights). The weight on signal A increases, and the
same on B decreases as the complementarity parameter increases.
Hypothesis 3 (Complementarity in information acquisition). The likelihood of a player’s ac-
quiring signal B increases with her opponent’s acquiring the same signal.
Hypothesis 4 (Complementarity and likelihood of acquisition). As the complementarity param-
eter increases, the likelihood of a player’s acquiring signal B decreases.
Hypothesis 5 (Information cost and likelihood of acquisition).
a) At low complementarity, information cost has no impact on the likelihood of a player’s
acquiring signal B;
b) At high complementarity, information cost decreases the likelihood of a player’s acquiring
signal B.
Hypothesis 1 follows from the fact that the ratio of the weights (derived in (A.5) and (A.6)
in the appendix) is
ωA
ωB
=
(1− r)α2B + κ2B
(1− r)α2A + κ2A
.
Thus, ωA > ωB if
1
κ2A
> 1
κ2B
, that is, signal A is assigned more weight than signal B if the clarity
of information source A is greater than the clarity of source B.
For Hypothesis 2, note that since αA > αB, and κA < κB,
dωA
dr
> 0 and
dωB
dr
< 0,
which implies that the weight on signal A increases, but the same on B decreases with the
complementarity parameter r. In Table 2, last column, we show the equilibrium signal weights
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for r ∈ {0.2, 0.8}. At r = 0.2, the weights are ωA = 0.55 and ωB = 0.44, whereas at r = 0.8,
ωA = 0.80, and ωB = 0.18.
9
[Insert Table 2 near here]
Hypothesis 3 follows directly from Result 1. Hypothesis 4 is based on Table 1, which shows
that a player’s expected benefits for a signal with higher clarity increases, and the same for a
signal with lower clarity decreases with the complementarity parameter. As r increases from 0.2
to 0.8, B1′1(11)r=0.8 = 933 > 542 = B1′1(11)r=0.2, but B11′ (11)r=0.8 = 32 < 344 = B11′ (11)r=0.2.
Hypothesis 5 is based on Result 2 and Table 3 (last column),10 which show that at low
complementarity, a player acquires both signals at high as well as low information costs, whereas
at high complementarity, he acquires both signals at low costs, but acquires only the signal
with higher clarity at high costs. The equilibrium information acquisition decision is consistent
with the fact that at low complementarity (r = 0.2), a player’s expected benefits from acquiring
either of the signals (conditional on the other player’s acquiring both signals) are higher than
the information costs under both high- and low-cost treatments (i.e., B1′1(11) = 542 > c, and
B11l(11) = 344 > c) for any c ∈ {5, 200}. However, at high complementarity (r = 0.8), B1′1(11) =
933 > c for any c ∈ {5, 200}, whereas B11l(11) = 32 < c = 200.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
9In the first four columns, we show theoretical signal weights assuming finite level of reasoning by the
subjects. We discuss subjects’ limited level of reasoning in Section 5.1. Signal weights under equilibrium
conditions (equilibrium weights) and limited levels of reasoning are shown in the same table for the ease
of comparison.
10In the first four columns, we show subjects’ information acquisition decisions assuming limited levels
of reasoning, which we discuss in detail in Section 5.1.
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3 The Experiment
This section describes our experiment design and procedure.
3.1 Experimental Design
We manipulate two factors in our experiment: (i) strength of complementarity r, and (ii) informa-
tion acquisition cost c. We adopt a 2 × 2, between-subject design (Low Complementarity/High
Complementarity × Low Cost/High Cost). The parameter r is 0.2 in Low Complementarity
condition, and 0.8 in High Complementarity condition. The information acquisition cost is 5 for
each clue in the Low Cost condition, and 200 in the High Cost condition.
We conduct 3 sessions for each treatment and 12 sessions in total. Each session has 12
participants, divided into 2 groups of equal size. Each participant is matched with another
participant in the same group. Participants interact only within their own group. In total,
there are 6 independent group-level observations for each treatment. Table 4 provides a session
summary.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Each experimental session has two stages. In the first stage, two clues, A and B, are provided
to the subjects at no cost. This stage with exogenously provided signals allows subjects to learn
the value of the two signals while making action choices in the beauty contest game. There are
10 rounds in this stage. After each round, subjects receive feedback about the true value of
the fundamental θ, their partners’ action choices, and their own payoffs. In the second stage,
subjects first make information acquisition decisions, and then play the beauty contest game. In
the information acquisition stage, subjects simultaneously decide whether to purchase clue A,
clue B, both, or none of the clues by paying the required costs. After subjects make their own
information acquisition decision, they are informed about their partners’ information acquisition
decisions. Participants then receive their chosen clue(s) and simultaneously make action choices
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in the beauty contest game. There are 20 rounds in this stage. After each round, subjects receive
feedback about the true value of θ, their partners’ action choices and their own payoffs.
Each session has 30 rounds. Subjects are re-matched in each round within their group. We
generate 30 independent values of θ, and 2 clues for each value of θ. The same sets of fundamental
θ values and clues are used in all experimental sessions. The mean (standard deviation) of the
realized θ values is 464 (175) and the values range from 144 to 805.
3.2 Experimental Procedure
We conducted our experiments using a computer program written in JAVA at a university com-
puter laboratory during the 2017 spring. In total, 144 student subjects (undergraduate and
graduate) participated in 12 sessions.
In each session, after reading the instructions, subjects then completed a quiz to test their
understanding of the instructions. The experimenter then reviewed the instructions. Subjects
participated first in the exogenous information (first) stage for 10 rounds and then in the en-
dogenous information (second) stage for additional 20 rounds. In the second stage, subjects first
made information acquisition decisions and then played the beauty contest game. At the end of
the session, subjects completed a post-experiment questionnaire (the instruction, quiz, and the
questionnaire are in the appendix). Screen shots of the two stages are shown in Figure 3.
Subjects were paid in cash after successfully completing the two stages. Subjects’ payments
were based on their performance, which was measured in a fictitious currency, “experimental
francs,” and then converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of $1 for every 200 francs. At the end of
each session, we randomly selected two rounds from each stage and paid the subjects based on
their cumulative payoffs from these four rounds. Each session lasted approximately 2 hours and
the average cash payment was $26.9.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
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4 Experimental Results
In this section, we first report the results of the stage with exogenously provided clues and then
the stage with endogenously acquired clues.
4.1 Exogenous Clues (Stage 1)
We use the data from this stage to study how the subjects used the two clues to make action
choices in the beauty contest game. Theory predicts that subjects choose actions that are weighted
averages of the two clues and the prior. The higher the clue clarity, the greater the weight on
that clue. We find that almost all actions fall between the minimum and maximum of the three
sources of information. Ninety-nine percent (100%) of action choices fall in this interval for r = 0.2
(r = 0.8). Since the variance of the prior is much larger than the variance of the two clues, we
expected subjects to put most of the weights on the two clues. We also check the percentage of
actions that fall between the minimum and maximum of the two clues. Eighty-five percent (88%)
of choices fall in this interval for r = 0.2 (r = 0.8). For actions within this interval, we report the
percentage of actions that are closer to A, closer to B, or in the middle. As r increases, we expect
a higher proportion of actions closer to A, the clue with higher clarity but lower content. About
47% (64%) of actions are closer to A for r = 0.2 (r = 0.8). Table 5 summarizes those results.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We estimate the relative weights on the two clues using subjects’ decisions. In each session,
subjects were divided into two groups and interacted only within their own group. We estimate
the weights per group per session. In our statistical analyses, we use each of these group-specific
estimates to test our hypotheses since the individual observations within each group are not
independent. We run the following regression using data for individual i in each round t for each
independent group:
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ait = α+ βAx
it
A + βBx
it
B + 
it. (16)
The weight on clue A (B) is captured by the coefficient βA(βB), the weight on the prior is
1 − βA − βB. Panel (A) of Table 6 reports estimated average weights on the two clues for all
groups in all sessions.
[Insert Table 6 here]
We estimate the weights using data from the first and second half of stage 1 separately to
evaluate whether systematic trends exist over time and find no systematic changes from the
first to the second half of data. We compare the average estimated weights with the theoretical
predicted weights. For r = 0.2, the estimated weights on A is 0.5 for the first half, which is
significantly smaller than the theoretical prediction 0.55 (p = 0.02 one-tailed Wilcoxon rank
test); the estimated weights on A is 0.47 for the second half, which is also significantly smaller
than the theoretical prediction (p = 0.003). For r = 0.8, the estimated weights on A is 0.61 using
data from the first or second half, which are significantly smaller than the theoretical prediction
0.80 (p = 0.0002).
4.1.1 Hypotheses Tests
Our Hypotheses 1 and 2 are related to the relative importance of clues A and B in subjects’
action choices. Results of the hypothesis tests are shown in panel (B) of Table 6. For r = 0.2,
the estimated weights on A is not significantly different from the weights on B (p = 0.83). Thus,
we reject H1 for r = 0.8. However, for r = 0.2, the estimated weights on A are significantly
greater than the weights on B (p = 0.0002) using data from both first and second halves. Thus,
we cannot reject H1 for r = 0.8.
We find evidence supporting H2. The estimated weights on A for r = 0.8 are significantly
greater than the weights on A for r = 0.2 with p-value of 0.0003 and 0.0001 for the first and
second half, respectively. In contrast, the estimated weights on B for r = 0.8 are significantly
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smaller than the weights on B for r = 0.2 with p-value of 0.0003 and 0.0006, respectively.
4.2 Endogenous Information Acquisition (Stage 2)
4.2.1 Descriptive Evidence on Information Acquisition
There are four possible information acquisition strategies: buy A only, buy B only, buy both clues
and buy no clues. Figure 1 plots the frequency of each strategy in each treatment over time.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The frequency of buying no clues (depicted in circle) is close to 0 in all treatments. This strat-
egy is strictly dominated by other strategies. The frequency of buying B (depicted in diamond)
is also very small. This strategy is strictly dominated by buying A. The frequency of buying A
is greater than buying B in all treatments. The two other strategies vary by treatments. For
r = 0.2, the frequency of buying both clues (depicted in triangle) is the highest. For r = 0.8 and
c = 200, the frequency of buying A (depicted in square) is the highest. For r = 0.8 and c = 5,
the strategies of buying A and buying both have similar frequencies.
Table 7 reports the frequency of each strategy observed in each independent group in each
session, using data from the first (second) half of each session.
[Insert Table 7 here]
There is no evidence of a time trend. The strategy is similar between the first ten rounds
and last ten rounds. We use the last ten rounds for our following discussion. For r = 0.2, the
frequency of buying both clues is the greatest among all four strategies and this frequency is 86%
when the cost is 5 and 64% when the cost is 200. For r = 0.8, when the cost is 200, the frequency
of buying A only is 77%, the highest among the four strategies; when the cost is 5, the frequency
of buying A only is similar to the frequency of buying both clues. For r = 0.8/c = 5, among
the six group-level observations, one group converges towards buying A only with a frequency
approaching 90% in the last ten rounds. Two groups converge towards buying both clues with a
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frequency approaching 83% and 75%, respectively. For the other three groups, both strategies of
buying A only and buying both clues are selected with high frequency.
To evaluate the stability of information acquisition strategy over time, we calculate the tran-
sition matrix of information acquisition strategies for all the four treatments using data from all
rounds. Results are reported in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 here]
For r = 0.2, buying both clues is the absorbent state. The likelihood of continuing to buy
both clues is 98.31% when the cost is 5 and 89.37% when the cost is 200. For r = 0.8 and c = 5,
buying A only and buying both clues are both absorbent states. The likelihood of continuing to
buy A only is 84.08% and the likelihood of continuing to buy both clues is 85.55%. For r = 0.8
and c = 200, most observations are buying A only and the likelihood of continuing this strategy
is 89.6%.
At the subject level, we observe that most individuals do not change their information ac-
quisition decisions. Only 16 out of 144 subjects changed their information acquisition decision
more than 5 times during stage 2. Nine subjects changed their information acquisition decision
more than 10 times. We classify these type of subjects as “indeterminate.” Table 9 reports the
percentage of subjects adopting each information acquisition strategy.
[Insert Table 9 here]
4.2.2 Hypotheses Tests
Our Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 are related to the acquisition of clue B because the acquisition of clue
A does not vary with our manipulations. We plot the frequency of buying A and B separately in
Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
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Figure 2 Panel A plots the frequency of buying A. There are no systematic differences in the
frequency of buying A across various treatments. The frequency of buying A converges toward
100% in all treatments. Panel B of Figure 2 plots the frequency of buying B, which varies by
treatments systematically. For r = 0.2, the frequency of buying B approaches 100% for the
treatment with c = 5, and this frequency is reduced when the cost is 200. For r = 0.8, the
frequency of buying B is the lowest in the treatment with c = 200, and this frequency is higher
when c = 5. The frequency of buying B is always higher when r = 0.2 than when r = 0.8.
We run a Probit regression to test our hypotheses on the acquisition of clue B. The dependent
variable, Buy B, is a dummy variable which is 1 if a subject buys clue B and 0 otherwise. Table
10 reports the regression results. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
[Insert Table 10 here]
The explanatory variable Partner BuyB is a dummy variable, which is 1 if the partner
buys clue B and 0 otherwise. H3 predicts that a subject is more likely to acquire clue B if the
matched partner also acquires clue B; therefore, the coefficient on Partner BuyB is expected to
be positive. Consistent with H3, we find that the coefficient on Partner BuyB is 0.905, which
is significantly positive (p < 0.001).
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the likelihood of buying B decreases with r. Our explanatory
variable includes r, a dummy variable, which is 1 if r = 0.8 and 0 if r = 0.2. Consistent with H4,
we find that the coefficient on r is -1.576, which is significantly negative (p < 0.001).
Hypothesis 5a predicts that cost of information acquisition has no effect on the likelihood
of acquiring clue B for r = 0.2. In contrast, Hypothesis 5b predicts that cost of information
acquisition reduces the likelihood of acquiring clue B for r = 0.8. We include a dummy variable
Cost, which is 1 if c = 200 and 0 if c = 5. In addition, we include an interaction between r and
Cost. We find that the coefficient on Cost is -0.945, which is significantly negative (p < 0.01).
There is a significant main effect of cost on the acquisition of clue B. However, the interaction
term between r and Cost is not statistically significant, which suggests that the effect of cost
on the acquisition of clue B does not differ between high and low r treatments. Our evidence
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supports H5b, but rejects H5a. Higher cost of information acquisition reduces acquisition of clue
B in both high and low r treatments.
5 Discussions
5.1 Limited Levels of Reasoning
In this section, we examine whether the incongruity between the observed and theoretical signal
weights, and information acquisition decisions can be explained by subjects’ limited levels (depths)
of reasoning (level-k model) in the sense of Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995). The
equilibrium weights we have developed in Section 2.1 are based on strong assumptions of players’
rationality—i.e., they can make the fixed-point argument in solving Nash equilibria. Experimental
evidence suggests that subjects’ responses can systematically deviate from Nash equilibrium (e.g.,
Crawford et al., 2013). Subjects tend to avoid the fixed-point argument as well as the indefinitely
iterated dominance reasoning required in equilibrium definition.
A level-k model is based on the assumption that subjects’ behaviors can be classified by
different depths of reasoning. A level-0 player chooses her behavior randomly without forming
any beliefs about her opponent. A level-1 player believes that her opponent is a level-0 player,
and best responds to this belief. Similarly, a level-2 player best responds to a level-1 opponent,
a level-3 player to a level-2 opponent, and so on. In general, a level-k player best responds to a
level-k-1 opponent by taking a level-k action. However, no player can anticipate how an opponent
with the same or higher level (i.e., equally smart or smarter opponent) will act. This feature of
a level-k model circumvents the need for a player to be able to use the fixed-point argument to
solve a Nash equilibrium (e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994). Theoretically, as k →∞, a level-k action
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium action.
Prior literature on beauty-contest games have used level-k models to explain subjects’ nonequi-
librium behavior (Cornand and Heinemann, 2013; Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2016). Unlike these
studies, we have an additional stage of information acquisition. A level-k player in our setup
24
has a 2-dimensional strategy 〈(ωA,k, ωB,k) , (zA,k, zB,k)〉, where (ωA,k, ωB,k) are optimal signal
weights, and (zA,k, zB,k) are optimal information acquisition decisions. One innovation in our
theory development is to derive information acquisition equilibria at limited levels of reasoning.
Consistent with the spirit of a level-k model, we start by assuming that a level-0 action has
a uniform distribution over the action space. That is, a level-0 player’s choice of signal weights
and information acquisition decision are random and do not depend on information costs. We
then recursively derive optimal signal weights and information acquisition decisions for level-1
upwards. Derivation of level-k signal weights and information acquisition equilibria are shown in
the appendix.
Table 2 summarizes signal weights at level-1 to level-4, and at equilibrium for r ∈ {0.2, 0.8}.
Comparing estimated group-specific weights reported in Table 6 with weights assuming limited
levels of reasoning summarized in Table 2, the observed average weights are close to the weights of
level-2 reasoning for r = 0.8. Using the second half data, the average estimated weights on signal
A is 0.61 for r = 0.8, which is not significantly different from the weights of level-2 reasoning 0.68
(p = 0.146). The average estimated weights on signal B is 0.39, which is not significantly different
from the weights of level-2 reasoning 0.30 (p = 0.774). For r = 0.2, however, the observed weights
are close to the weights of level-1 reasoning. Using the second half data, the average estimated
weights on A is 0.47 for r = 0.8, which is not significantly different from the weights of level-1
reasoning 0.49 (p = 0.146). The average estimated weights on B is 0.53, which is not significantly
different from the weights of level-1 reasoning 0.49 (p = 0.388). The estimated weight on A is
significantly smaller than the predicted weight on A of level-2 reasoning 0.54 (p = 0.03), and the
estimated weights on B is significantly greater than the weights on A of level-2 reasoning 0.45
(p = 0.019). Our results are similar to the findings of Cornand and Heinemann (2013), which
show that subjects’ level of reasoning is higher for higher values of r.
Table 3 presents optimal information acquisition decisions at level-1 to level-4, and at equi-
librium for r ∈ {0.2, 0.8}. It shows that at r = 0.2, the optimal information acquisition decision
is acquiring both the signals at any level of reasoning. At r = 0.8, and c = 200, acquiring only
signal one is the unique optimal decision at all levels of reasoning above level-1. However, at
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r = 0.8, and c = 5, acquiring both signals is the unique optimal decision at all levels except
level-3, where the optimal decision is acquiring only signal one with higher clarity. The intuition
is that, while high complementarity increases a subject’s likelihood of acquiring only signal A, low
information cost enhances the odds of acquiring both signals. At level-3, the complementarity
effect dominates the cost effect. In other levels, low costs overwhelm the complementarity effect.
Table 11 summarizes the values of expected benefits at level-1 to level-4, and at equilibrium for
r ∈ {0.2, 0.8}.
[Insert Table 11 near here]
5.2 Acquisition Equilibria with Estimated Weights
To further examine the difference between observed and predicted information acquisition deci-
sions for the treatment r = 0.8/c = 5, we replace equilibrium signal weights at the beauty contest
stage by their estimated weights, and then work backward to calculate optimal information acqui-
sition decision. Specifically, we replace equilibrium signal weights for information profiles 11(11),
11(10), and 10(11) by their estimated weights from Table 6. For example, in information profile
11(11), we replace equilibrium signal weights of ωA = 0.81, ωB = 0.18 (Table 2) by their esti-
mated weights of ωA = 0.61, ωB = 0.39 (last 10 rounds). Similarly, for information profiles 11(10)
and 10(11), we replace equilibrium signal weights of ωA = 0.87, ωB = 0.11 (untabulated) by their
estimated weights of ωA = 0.51, ωB = 0.49 (untabulated).
11 All other weights are kept at their
equilibrium levels. The resulting information acquisition equilibria are: 10(10) and11(11), which
are consistent with the experimental data.
Our theoretical analysis assuming that subjects use the experimentally estimated weights
suggests that both buy A only and buy both clues are equilibria for the treatment r = 0.8 and
c = 5. Results shown in Table 7 on the information acquisition by groups indicate the presence
of two equilibria. The highest frequency of information acquisition strategy is to buy A only for
11For information choice profiles, 11(01) and 01(11), we left signal weights at their equilibrium values
because we could not derive estimated weights due to the small sample size (N=9).
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three out of the six groups, and to buy both clues for the other three groups. When there are
multiple equilibria, subjects need to learn over time to coordinate on one of the two equilibria.
The convergence toward these two equilibria appears to be incomplete in most groups. Subjects
indicated in their post-experiment questionnaire that they were more likely to buy B if their
partners bought B in the past round(s). To examine such a dynamic adaptation process, we run
Probit regressions on subjects’ decisions to buy B. The explanatory variables include own decision
and partners’ decision to acquire B in the past round. Lag BuyB is 1 if a subject acquires B
in the previous round and 0 otherwise. Lag Partner BuyB is 1 if a subject’s partner in the
previous round acquires B and 0 otherwise. Our regression uses the data from the last ten rounds
and standard errors are clustered at the group level. Results are shown in Table 12.
[Insert Table 12 near here]
One interesting observation in the Probit regression (Table 12) is that the Lag Partner BuyB
is significant and positive only in the treatment r = 0.8/c = 5. In other treatments, a player’s
decision to acquire signal B does not depend on his partner’s past acquisition of B. For the
treatment r = 0.8/c = 5, the regression coefficient on Lag Partner BuyB is 0.552, which is
significantly positive (p = 0.022). This evidence confirms the dynamics indicated in the post-
experiment questionnaire. That is, subjects were more likely to buy B if their partners bought
B in the previous round. This indicates that subjects tried to coordinate on one of the two
equilibria, buy A only or buy both.
5.3 Clue Uses
Prior research in psychology has shown that people tend to use information more when it comes
at a cost compared to when it is given for free. Thaler (1980) notes that “paying for the right to
use a good or service will increase the rate at which the good will be utilized, ceteris paribus. This
hypothesis will be referred to as the sunk cost effect.” If this sunk cost effect is present in our
setting, we then expect the use of information to differ when clues are exogenously given versus
when clues are acquired endogenously. Here, we study whether such a sunk cost effect exists in
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our setting. Specifically, we compare the weights subjects place on clues A and B when the clues
are provided exogenously (Table 6) free of costs with those under endogenous information choices
(Table 13) when subjects pay for clues. In Table 13, we estimate the weights on clue A and B
using the regression model (16) for each treatment conditional on partners’ clue choices. We test
whether the weight on A is different from that on B. We pooled data from all sessions in each
treatment because the number of observations in each session is small.
[Insert Table 13 here]
We separate our analysis using the first ten rounds and last ten rounds data so that this result
can be compared with a similar analysis using data in stage 1 where both clues are exogenously
given (see Table 6). For r = 0.2, the estimated weights on A and B are not significantly different
from each other. For r = 0.8, only a small number of observations exist when the cost is 200;
when the cost is 5, we find the estimated weight on A is significantly greater than the estimated
weight on B using the last ten rounds data (p = 0.04). The estimated weights on A is 0.61 and
on B is 0.38, which are similar to results in stage 1 where clues are exogenously given (Table
6). Overall, subjects’ use of information under endogenous information choice is similar to that
under exogenously provided information, implying the absence of the sunk cost effect.
6 Concluding Remarks
We study how beauty contest incentives affect players’ acquisition and use of multiple information
sources with different contents and clarities. We provide experimental evidence that strong beauty
contest incentives lead players to completely ignore an information source with high content if
it has low clarity. Instead, players acquire information from a source with higher clarity despite
its lower content. Our theory predicts that, when information is exogenously provided, players’
desire to coordinate induces them to under-weight information with low clarity and high content.
Our experimental results suggest that the under-use of information with low clarity is weaker
than theoretical predictions assuming an infinite level of higher order beliefs, but closer to level-2
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reasoning in a cognitive behavioral model.
When players acquire information endogenously, our theory predicts that the coordination
motive can induce players to completely ignore information with low clarity despite its high
content. Our experimental evidence suggests that the under-acquisition of information with low
clarity is even stronger than our theoretical predictions. In anticipation of the over-use of the less-
clear information at the beauty contest stage, subjects underacquire the less-clear information
more often than equilibrium predictions.
These results have important practical implications for a firm’s disclosure choices when coor-
dination motives are present. Investors can ignore a firm’s disclosure if it is not sufficiently clear,
even though the disclosure has high content with all the technical details. More damagingly, to
gather information, investors focus their attention to outside non-firm information sources, which
can be arguably more clear, but have lower content, than firm disclosures. In a post-truth age
with so-called “fake news” and “alternative facts,” this is a concern for firms as well as regulators
and standard setters.
Our paper takes the first step to understanding the differential impacts of content and clarity
on the use and acquisition decisions in situations in which coordination motives predominate.
There are several avenues for future research. We assume information choice to be discrete; i.e.,
acquire or not acquire. Future studies may examine how a subject’s attention choice changes
continuously with a source’s content and clarity. For example, conditional on acquiring a signal,
does a subject’s attention to that signal increase monotonically with the source content and clarity,
or the attention changes non-monotonically? Another potential avenue for future research is to
endogenize the beauty contest motive by examining investors’ use and acquisition behaviors in
short-horizon trading in financial markets.
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APPENDIX
A Derivations
A.1 Equilibrium Signal Weights
Here, we derive signal weights for a symmetric information choice profile 11(11). Since both
players acquire signals from both information sources, we conjecture that their linear action
strategies follow (4) and (5). By (3), player i’s optimal action is
ai = (1− r)E [θ|xiA, xiB]+ rE [θ¯ + ωˆjA (xjA − θ¯)+ ωˆjB (xjB − θ¯) |xiA, xiB] , (A.1)
where “hat” represents conjectured value. After replacing the values of E
[
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]
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]
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xjB − θ¯|xiA, xiB
]
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[
θ¯ +
{
σ2θ
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
D
}(
xiA − θ¯
)
+
{
σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
D
}(
xiB − θ¯
)]
+ rθ¯
+ rωˆjA
[{
α2A
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ σ2θ
(
α2A + α
2
B + κ
2
B
)
D
}(
xiA − θ¯
)
+
{
κ2Aσ
2
θ
D
}(
xiB − θ¯
)]
+ rωˆjB
[{
κ2Bσ
2
θ
D
}(
xiA − θ¯
)
+
{
α2B
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
+ σ2θ
(
α2A + α
2
B + κ
2
A
)
D
}(
xiB − θ¯
)]
. (A.2)
Comparing coefficients of
(
xiA − θ¯
)
and
(
xiB − θ¯
)
in (4) and (A.2), we have
ωiA =
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ rωˆjA
{
α2A
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ σ2θ
(
α2A + α
2
B + κ
2
B
)}
+ rωˆjBκ
2
Bσ
2
θ
D
(A.3)
ωiB =
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
+ rωˆjAκ
2
Aσ
2
θ + rωˆ
j
B
{
α2B
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
+ σ2θ
(
α2A + α
2
B + κ
2
A
)}
D
. (A.4)
In equilibrium, ωˆln = ω
l
n for any l ∈ {i, j} and any n ∈ {A,B}. For a symmetric equilibrium,
ωiA = ω
i
A = ωA and ω
i
B = ω
j
B = ωB, which with (A.3) and (A.4) lead to two equations and two
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unknowns. After some algebra, the equilibrium weights are:
ωA =
1
(1−r)α2A+κ2A
1
(1−r)σ2θ
+ 1
(1−r)α2A+κ2A
+ 1
(1−r)α2B+κ2B
(A.5)
ωB =
1
(1−r)α2B+κ2B
1
(1−r)σ2θ
+ 1
(1−r)α2A+κ2A
+ 1
(1−r)α2B+κ2B
. (A.6)
A.2 Expected Losses
Note that for any n ∈ {A,B}
ai − θ = ωi0ζθ +
∑
n=A,B
ωin
(
ηn + ε
i
n
)
,
and
ai − aj = −
(
ωi0 − ωj0
)
ζθ +
∑
n=A,B
(
ωin − ωjn
)
ηn +
∑
n=A,B
(
ωinε
i
n − ωjnεjn
)
where ωi0 = 1− ωiA − ωiB and ωj0 = 1− ωjA − ωjB. Thus
E
[
(ai − θ)2
]
=
(
ωi0
)2
σ2θ +
∑
n=A,B
(
ωin
)2
α2n +
∑
n=A,B
(
ωin
)2
κ2n (A.7)
E
[
(ai − aj)2
]
=
(
ωi0 − ωj0
)2
σ2θ +
∑
n=A,B
(
ωin − ωjn
)2
α2n +
∑
n=A,B
[(
ωin
)2
+
(
ωjn
)2]
κ2n.(A.8)
A.3 Limited Levels of Reasoning
A.3.1 Level-k Signal Weights
Here, we derive the optimal level-k weights for the information choice profile 11(10). The weights
for the rest of the cases can be derived using an analogous method. Like Nagel (1995) and Stahl
and Wilson (1994), we assume that an level-0 action has a uniform distribution over the action
space, which, in our case, is the reals. Following Cornand and Heinemann (2013); Baeriswyl and
Cornand (2016), we define a level-1 action to be the first order expectation of the state conditional
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on the player’s information set:
ai1 = E
[
θ|Ii] . (A.9)
Given the information choice profile 11(10), suppose that, for any k > 0, player i believes that
player j attaches weight ωjA,k to the signal from A such that player j’s level-k action is
ajk = θ¯ + ω
j
A,k(x
j
A − θ¯).
By the optimality condition (3), player i’s best response (level-k+1 action) to j’s action is
aik+1 = (1− r)E
[
θ|xiA, xiB
]
+ rE
[
θ¯ + ωjA,k(x
j
A − θ¯)|xiA, xiB
]
= θ¯ +
[
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ rωjA,k
{
α2A
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ σ2θ
(
α2A + α
2
B + κ
2
B
)}
D
] (
xiA − θ¯
)
+
[
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
+ rωjA,kκ
2
Aσ
2
θ
D
] (
xiB − θ¯
)
,
where
D ≡ (α2A + κ2A) (α2B + κ2B)+ σ2θ (α2A + κ2A + α2B + κ2B) . (A.10)
Thus, player i’s level-k+1 signal weights are:
ωiA,k+1 =
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ rωjA,k
{
α2A
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
+ σ2θ
(
α2A + α
2
B + κ
2
B
)}
D
(A.11)
ωiB,k+1 =
(1− r)σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
+ rωjA,kκ
2
Aσ
2
θ
D
. (A.12)
Player j believes that player i attaches weight ωiA,k to the signal from A, and ω
i
B,k to the
signal from B such that player i’s Lk action is
aik = θ¯ + ω
i
A,k(x
i
A − θ¯) + ωiB,k(xiB − θ¯). (A.13)
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Player j’s best response to player i’s action is
ajk+1 = (1− r)E
[
θ|xjA
]
+ rE
[
θ¯ + ωiA,k(x
j
A − θ¯) + ωiB,k(xjB − θ¯)|xjA
]
= θ¯ +
[
(1− r)σ2θ + rωiA,k
(
σ2θ + α
2
A
)
+ rωiB,kσ
2
θ
σ2θ + α
2
A + κ
2
A
](
xjA − θ¯
)
.
Thus, j’s level-k+1 signal weight is
ωj1,k+1 =
(1− r)σ2θ + rωiA,k
(
σ2θ + α
2
A
)
+ rωiB,kσ
2
θ
σ2θ + α
2
A + κ
2
A
. (A.14)
As defined in (A.9), player i’s level-1 action is
ai1 = E
[
θ|xiA, xiB
]
= θ¯ +
[
σ2θ
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
D
] (
xiA − θ¯
)
+
[
σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
D
] (
xiB − θ¯
)
,
such that player i’s level-1 signal weights are
ωiA,1 =
σ2θ
(
α2B + κ
2
B
)
D
; ωiB,1 =
σ2θ
(
α2A + κ
2
A
)
D
, (A.15)
where D is defined in (A.10). Similarly, player j’s level-1 signal weight is
ωjA,1 =
σ2θ
σ2θ + α
2
A + κ
2
A
. (A.16)
Player i’s level-2 signal weights, ωiA,2 and ω
i
B,2, are derived by replacing j’s level-1 weights
from (A.16) in (A.11)-(A.12). Similarly, use (A.15) in (A.14) to derive j’s level-2 signal weight,
ωjA,2, which, in turn, is used to derive i’s level-3 signal weights, ω
i
A,3 and ω
i
B,3, and so on.
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A.3.2 Level-k Information Acquisition
For calculating the ex-ante expected utility for player i, we use Lk signal weights of player i, and
level-k-1 weights of player j. Specifically, for any k > 1, i’s level-k ex-ante expected utility is
U ik = u¯− Lik − C
(
xi
)
, (A.17)
where, for any n ∈ {A,B}, the expected loss function at level k is:
Lik =
[
(1− r) (ωi0,k)2 + r (ωi0,k − ωj0,k−1)2]σ2θ (A.18)
+
2∑
n=1
[
(1− r) (ωin,k)2 + r (ωin,k − ωjn,k−1)2]α2n
+
2∑
n=1
[
(1− r) (ωin,k)2 + r{(ωin,k)2 + (ωjn,k−1)2}]κ2n.
Using a similar notational convention as before, we denote a player’s level-k ex-ante expected
utility as
U ik,ab(cd) = U
i
k,ziA,k=a,z
i
B,k=b
(zjA,k−1 = c, z
i
B,k−1 = d).
A level-k player uses these utilities to derive his optimal information acquisition decision.
For the assumed parameter set in (15), players’ optimal information acquisition decisions at
level-1-level-4 are shown in Table 3. For example, consider the case of r = 0.8 and c = 5. At
level-1, a player’s optimal acquisition decision is (ziA,1 = 1, z
i
B,1 = 1). The methodology used
for the derivation is the following. A level-1 player’s ex-ante expected utilities (i.e., U i1,ab(cd))
are calculated using the values of {ωiA,1, ωiB,1} (derived by using (A.9)). For a level-1 player, his
opponent is a level-0 player, who places equal probability to any of the four possible information
acquisition choices, {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}. A level-1 player computes his expected payoffs
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over the distribution of his level-0 opponent’s choices as
U i1,ab ≡
1
4
[
U i1,ab(11) + U
i
1,ab(10) + U
i
1,ab(01) + U
i
1,ab(00)
]
,
for any a, b ∈ {1, 0}. Thus, a level-1 optimal information acquisition decision is
(ziA,1 = a
∗, ziB,1 = b
∗) = arg max
a,b
U i1,ab,
that is, he chooses an information profile (a∗, b∗) that corresponds to the maximum of U i1,11, U i1,10,
U i1,01 and U
i
1,00. The optimal acquisition decision turns out to be (z
i
A,1 = 1, z
i
B,1 = 1).
A level-2 player uses his level-2 signal weights (ωiA,2 and ω
i
B,2), and his opponent’s level-1
signal weights (ωjA,1 and ω
j
B,1) to derive his ex-ante expected utilities using (A.17) and (A.18).
Since a level-1 opponent’s optimal acquisition decision is (zjA,1 = 1, z
j
B,1 = 1), a level-2 player’s
optimal information acquisition choice is given by
(ziA,2 = a
∗, ziB,2 = b
∗) = arg max
a,b
U i2,ab(11),
that is, he chooses an information profile (a∗, b∗) that corresponds to the maximum of U i2,11(11),
U i2,10(11), U
i
2,01(11) and U
i
2,00(11). As shown in Table 3, the level-2 optimal acquisition decision
for r = 0.8 and c = 5 is (ziA,2 = 1, z
i
B,2 = 1).
Similarly, a level-3 player uses his level-3 signal weights (ωiA,3 and ω
i
B,3), and his opponent’s
level-2 signal weights (ωjA,2 and ω
j
B,2) to derive his ex-ante expected utilities, and best responds
to his opponent’s level-2 optimal acquisition decision (zjA,2 = 1, z
j
B,2 = 1). As shown in Table 3,
the level-3 optimal acquisition decision for r = 0.8 and c = 5 is (ziA,3 = 1, z
i
B,3 = 0). Optimal
information choices at level-4 and upwards are derived in a similar way.
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Table 1: Expected Benefits of Information Acquisition
B1′0(10) B1′0(00) B01′ (01) B01′ (00) B11(11) B11(00) B1′1(11) B1′1(01) B11′ (11) B11′ (10)
r = 0 39096 39096 39096 39096 39543 39543 447 447 447 447
r = 0.2 36271 25021 35940 25021 36618 25307 542 437 344 290
r = 0.8 9032 1564 7857 1564 9065 1582 933 345 32 22
This table presents expected benefits of a player when he acquires one, two or none of the signals for parameter values in (15).
36
Table 2: Signal Weights
level-1 level-2 level-3 level-4 ... Equilibrium Weights
r = 0.8
ωA 0.49 0.68 0.75 0.78 ... 0.80
ωB 0.49 0.30 0.23 0.20 ... 0.18
r = 0.2
ωA 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.55 ... 0.55
ωB 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.44 ... 0.44
This table shows theoretical weights on signals A and B—for exogenous information structure—for equi-
librium as well as level-k models for parameter values in (15).
Table 3: Information Acquisition Decisions
level-1 level-2 level-3 level-4 ... Equilibrium
r = 0.8
c = 200 (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0) ... (1, 0)
c = 5 (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1) ... (1, 1)
r = 0.2
c = 200 (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) ... (1, 1)
c = 5 (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) ... (1, 1)
This table shows information acquisition decisions for equilibrium and level-k models for parameter values
in (15). Each decision shows player i’s information acquisition choices for signals A and B, (ziA,k ∈
{1, 0}, ziB,k ∈ {1, 0}), at level-k reasoning. A player at level-k best responds to a player at level-k-1.
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Table 4: Experimental Design
Low Cost (c = 5) High Cost (c = 200)
Low Coordination HR/HC HR/LC
(r = 0.2) (3 sessions) (3 sessions)
High Coordination LR/HC LR/LC
(r = 0.8) (3 sessions) (3 sessions)
This table summarizes the experimental design and the number of sessions. We adopt a 2X2, between-
subjects design that manipulates information acquisition cost (High Cost or Low Cost) and the coordina-
tion incentives parameter (High Coordination or Low Coordination). We conducted three experimental
sessions for each treatment. Each session includes 30 rounds. In Round 1-10 (Stage 1), clue A and clue
B are provided to subjects at no cost. In Round 11-30 (Stage 2), subjects make information acquisition
decisions.
Table 5: Guesses relative to Clues (Stage 1)
r = 0.2 r = 0.8
Inside [Min(xA, xB), Max(xA, xB)] 0.85 0.88
Closer to clue A 0.47 0.64
Middle 0.15 0.10
Closer to clue B 0.38 0.26
Inside [Min(xA, xB , 500), Max(xA, xB , 500)] 0.99 1.00
Number of Obs. 720 720
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Table 6: Estimated Clue Weights by Group (Stage 1)
Panel A: Group specific weights on clues
Treatment Session.Group First Half Second Half
Clue A Clue B Clue A Clue B
r = 0.2/c = 5 1.1 0.56 0.42 0.42 0.59
1.2 0.53 0.46 0.5 0.51
2.1 0.47 0.53 0.4 0.63
2.2 0.46 0.52 0.42 0.6
3.1 0.52 0.45 0.5 0.5
3.2 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.46
r = 0.2/c = 200 4.1 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.5
4.2 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.49
5.1 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.53
5.2 0.6 0.4 0.58 0.42
6.1 0.46 0.5 0.5 0.42
6.2 0.31 0.66 0.28 0.69
Average 0.5 0.49 0.47 0.53
Theoretical 0.55 0.44 0.55 0.44
r = 0.8/c = 5 7.1 0.58 0.4 0.54 0.46
7.2 0.69 0.31 0.69 0.31
8.1 0.59 0.4 0.59 0.43
8.2 0.69 0.3 0.7 0.27
9.1 0.58 0.43 0.54 0.48
9.2 0.62 0.38 0.64 0.38
r = 0.8/c = 200 10.1 0.55 0.44 0.57 0.41
10.2 0.56 0.43 0.56 0.43
11.1 0.56 0.43 0.58 0.42
11.2 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26
12.1 0.58 0.41 0.56 0.44
12.2 0.61 0.39 0.58 0.4
Average 0.61 0.38 0.61 0.39
Theoretical 0.8 0.18 0.8 0.18
Panel B: p-values for Wilcoxon signed rank tests (one-tailed)
Null Alternative First Half Second Half
H1 r = 0.2 ωA = ωB ωA > ωB 0.39 0.83
r = 0.2 ωA = 0.55 ωA < 0.55 0.02 0.003
H1 r = 0.8 ωA = ωB ωA > ωB 0.0002 0.0002
r = 0.8 ωA = 0.81 ωA < 0.81 0.0002 0.0002
H2 ωr=0.2A = ω
r=0.8
A ω
r=0.2
A < ω
r=0.8
A 0.0003 0.0001
H2 ωr=0.2B = ω
r=0.8
B ω
r=0.2
B > ω
r=0.8
B 0.0003 0.0006
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Table 7: Clue Acquisitions by Group
First Half Second Half
Treatment Session.Group Buy A Buy B Both None Buy A Buy B Both None
r = 0.2/c = 5 1.1 3% 7% 88% 2% 0% 15% 85% 0%
1.2 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
2.1 23% 10% 67% 0% 25% 8% 67% 0%
2.2 5% 0% 95% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
3.1 0% 2% 98% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
3.2 8% 22% 70% 0% 0% 33% 67% 0%
Average 7% 7% 86% 0% 4% 9% 86% 0%
Theoretical 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
r = 0.2/c = 200 4.1 50% 27% 17% 7% 70% 20% 10% 0%
4.2 15% 37% 47% 2% 5% 25% 70% 0%
5.1 7% 18% 67% 8% 3% 18% 78% 0%
5.2 12% 3% 80% 5% 0% 0% 100% 0%
6.1 37% 13% 50% 0% 33% 2% 65% 0%
6.2 33% 13% 53% 0% 23% 17% 60% 0%
Average 26% 19% 52% 4% 23% 14% 64% 0%
Theoretical 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
r = 0.8/c = 5 7.1 53% 2% 42% 3% 58% 0% 42% 0%
7.2 57% 0% 43% 0% 65% 2% 33% 0%
8.1 53% 0% 47% 0% 38% 0% 62% 0%
8.2 30% 0% 70% 0% 17% 0% 83% 0%
9.1 23% 0% 77% 0% 25% 0% 75% 0%
9.2 78% 8% 13% 0% 90% 5% 5% 0%
Average 49% 2% 49% 1% 49% 1% 50% 0%
Theoretical 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%
r = 0.8/c = 200 10.1 67% 7% 18% 8% 88% 8% 3% 0%
10.2 87% 0% 2% 12% 100% 0% 0% 0%
11.1 48% 2% 47% 3% 42% 13% 43% 2%
11.2 77% 2% 7% 15% 82% 0% 18% 0%
12.1 60% 27% 8% 5% 77% 23% 0% 0%
12.2 78% 20% 0% 2% 73% 27% 0% 0%
Average 69% 9% 14% 8% 77% 12% 11% 0%
Theoretical 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
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Table 8: Transition Matrix of Information Acquisition Decisions
Panel A: r = 0.2/c = 5
Acquisition Strategy in t Transition Probability from t to t+ 1 Obs.
None Buy A Buy B Buy Both
None 0% 100% 0% 0% 1
Buy A 0% 70.27% 10.81% 18.92% 37
Buy B 1.79% 5.36% 83.93% 8.93% 56
Both 0% 0.68% 1.02% 98.31% 590
Panel B: r = 0.2/c = 200
Acquisition Strategy in t Transition Probability from t to t+ 1 Obs.
None Buy A Buy B Buy Both
None 30.77% 23.08% 15.38% 30.77% 13
Buy A 1.23% 70.55% 14.72% 13.5% 163
Buy B 3.54% 15.04% 59.29% 22.12% 113
Both 0% 6.58% 4.05% 89.37% 395
Panel C: r = 0.8/c = 5
Acquisition Strategy in t Transition Probability from t to t+ 1 Obs.
None Buy A Buy B Buy Both
None 50% 50% 0% 0% 2
Buy A 0.3% 84.08% 1.80% 13.81% 333
Buy B 0% 60.00% 20.00% 20.00% 10
Both 0% 13.86% 0.59% 85.55% 339
Panel D: r=0.8/c=200
Acquisition Strategy in t Transition Probability from t to t+ 1 Obs.
None Buy A Buy B Buy Both
None 35.71% 53.57% 3.57% 7.14% 28
Buy A 1.80% 89.60% 4.40% 4.20% 500
Buy B 2.78% 26.39% 66.67% 4.17% 72
Both 3.57% 21.43% 3.57% 71.43% 84
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Table 9: Classification of individual by acquisition strategy
Buy A Buy B Both None Indeterminate
r = 0.2/c = 5 3% 11% 86% 0% 0%
r = 0.2/c = 200 19% 14% 58% 0% 8%
r = 0.8/c = 5 42% 0% 50% 0% 8%
r = 0.8/c = 200 75% 6% 11% 0% 8%
Table 10: Probit Regression on Decisions to Acquire Clue B
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable
Buy B Buy B
r −1.576 ∗ ∗∗
(0.386)
Cost −0.945 ∗ ∗
(0.403)
Cost*r 0.186
(0.510)
Partner BuyB 0.905 ∗ ∗∗
(0.247)
Intercept 1.593 ∗ ∗∗ −0.259
(0.314) (0.181)
Observations 2880 2880
R-squared 0.25 0.09
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the group level.
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Table 11: Expected Benefits for Limited Depths of Reasoning
r = 0.8 r = 0.2
level-1 level-2 level-3 level-4 Eqm. level-1 level-2 level-3 level-4 Eqm.
B1′0(10) 39096 39058 9032 9032 9032 39096 39086 36271 36271 36271
B1′0(00) 39096 1564 1564 1564 1564 39096 25021 25021 25021 25021
B01′(01) 39096 37732 7748 7776 7857 39096 38753 35940 35940 35940
B01′(00) 39096 1564 1564 1564 1564 39096 25021 25021 25021 25021
B11(11) 39543 39247 9019 9051 9065 39543 39456 36618 36618 36618
B11(00) 39543 1582 1582 1582 1582 39543 25307 25307 25307 25307
B1′1(11) 447 843 951 972 933 447 534 541 541 542
B1′1(01) 447 413 387 380 345 447 438 437 437 437
B11′(11) 447 170 −14 18 32 447 365 343 344 344
B11′(10) 447 22 22 22 22 447 290 290 290 290
This table shows a player’s expected benefits for different levels of reasoning.
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Table 12: Probit Regression of the Effect of Past Behavior on Decision to Acquire B. (Last 10 Rounds)
r=0.2/c=5 r=0.2/c=200 r=0.8/c=5 r=0.8/c=200
Lag BuyB 3.621∗∗∗ 2.283∗∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗ 2.332∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.607) (0.243) (0.184)
Lag Partner BuyB 0.231 0.489 0.552∗∗ −0.128
(0.233) (0.344) (0.241) (0.163)
Intercept −1.318∗∗∗ −1.097∗∗∗ −1.493∗∗∗ −1.489∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.143) (0.106) (0.233)
R square 0.71 0.46 0.5 0.44
Number of Obs. 360 360 360 360
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the group level.
Table 13: Estimated Clue Weights (Stage 2) Conditional on Acquiring Both Clues
First Half Second Half
clue A clue B Diff. Sig. N clue A clue B Diff. Sig. N
r = 0.2/c = 5 0.53 0.45 p = 0.44 246 0.50 0.49 p = 0.84 294
r = 0.2/c = 200 0.49 0.50 p = 0.87 98 0.52 0.46 p = 0.76 180
r = 0.8/c = 5 0.52 0.47 p = 0.65 74 0.61 0.38 p = 0.04 112
r = 0.8/c = 200 0.49 0.51 p = 0.758 12 0.50 0.50 p = 0.99 12
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Figure 1: Information Acquisition Strategy by Treatment and Round
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(A) Frequency of Clue A Acquired (Include Strategy of Buy A and Buy Both)
(B) Acquisition of Clue B by Treatment (Include Buy B and Buy Both)
Figure 2: Frequency of Clue A and B Acquired by Treatments
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Experimental Instructions  
[General Introduction] 
This is an experiment in decision making under uncertainty. You will be paid in cash at the end of the 
experiment based on your performance.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter to 
come to you.  Please do not talk or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment.   
You are part of a group of 12 persons participating in this experiment and each of you is allocated into 
two groups of 6 persons. You will only interact with the other 5 persons in your group, but not interact 
with anyone in the other group. The two groups are completely independent. 
This experiment has two parts. In each part, you play a guessing game. You play the same game 
repeatedly. In each round, you will be randomly matched with one of the other 5 persons in your group. 
In part one, there are 10 rounds. In part two, there are 20 rounds.  
Your earnings are measured in francs, and your objective is to maximize your francs.  At the end of the 
experiment, the computer will randomly select four rounds, and the sum of the francs in the four 
rounds selected will be used to determine your cash payoff. We will convert your francs into dollars at 
500 francs = 1 US dollar. Please read the instructions carefully and make your decisions wisely.  
[Part 1] 
There is an unknown number, Y. This unknown number is different in each round but identical for all the 
participants in the same group.  
In each round, you are asked to make a guess. Your payoff in each stage is described below. 
૜૙૙૙ െ ૙. ૡ ൈ ሺࢅ࢕࢛࢘	ࢍ࢛ࢋ࢙࢙ െ ࢅሻ૛ െ ૙. ૛ ൈ ሺࢅ࢕࢛࢘	ࢍ࢛ࢋ࢙࢙ െ ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢔ࢋ࢘ᇱ࢙	ࢍ࢛ࢋ࢙࢙ሻ૛ 
Your payoff is higher the closer your guess is to the unknown number Y, and the closer your guess is to 
your partner’s guess (about Y). To maximize your payoff, your guess has to be as close as possible to Y as 
well as to your partner’s guess. However, note that your losses from deviating from Y are four times of 
your losses from deviating from your partner’s guess. Thus, it is more important to be close to the 
unknown number Y than to the guess of your partner.  
Example 1: Suppose the true value of Y is 400 and your partner’s guess is 450. How much is your payoff 
in francs if your guess is 410?  
Answer: 3000‐0.8*(410‐400)^2‐0.2*(410‐450)^2=3000‐0.8*100‐0.2*1600=3000‐80‐320=2600. 
 
Example 2: Suppose that the true value of Y is 400 and that your partner’s guess is 450, how much is 
your payoff in francs if your guess is 440? 
Answer: 3000‐0.8*(440‐400)^2‐0.2*(440‐450)^2=3000‐0.8*1600‐0.2*100=3000‐1280‐20=1700. 
As you can see from the examples above, you make more francs if your guess is closer to the true value 
of Y than if your guess is closer to the guess of your partner because your losses from the deviation from 
Y are four times that of your losses from the deviation from your partner’s guess. 
In this experiment, you and your partner do not know Y, but both of you will receive two clues about Y, 
which will inform you about Y. In the rest of the instructions, we first explain how Y is generated. Then 
we explain how clues are generated. 
 Unknown Number Y  
For each round, the computer will randomly select a number Y. Y is drawn from a normal distribution 
with a mean of 500 and standard deviation of 200. Below is a picture of the likelihood of drawing each 
possible Y: 
 As you can see from the picture, the number that is most likely to be drawn is the mean (500) and the 
chance of  the other numbers being drawn decreases as  they move  further away  from  the mean. The 
standard deviation tells you how dispersed (i.e., spread out) the possible payoffs are. With approximately 
67%  chance, Y will be within one  standard deviation  (200) around  the mean. This  indicates  that Y  is 
between 300 (500–200) and 700 (500+200) about two‐thirds of the time. With approximately 95% chance, 
Y will be within  two  standard deviations  (200×2=400)  around  the mean  500.  This  indicates  that  Y  is 
between 100 (500–400) and 900 (500+400) about 95% of the time. 
In each round, the computer randomly draws a number according to the distribution outlined above. 
Different values of the number Y are drawn independently in each round, which means that the value of 
Y in one round is entirely unrelated to the values of Y in all of the other rounds. 
 
 
 
 Clues about Y 
Each player will receive two clues about Y. The two clues are Clue A and Clue B. The computer generates 
each of the two clues by adding two errors terms to Y. One error is a common error, which is the same 
for you and your partner. The other error is a private error, which is different between you and your 
partner. Thus, your clue A is likely to be different from your partner’s clue A, and your clue B is likely to 
be different from your partner’s clue B. Below we first explain how the computer generate two clue As, 
one for you and one for your partner.  
Clue A 
After the computer draws the unknown number Y, the computer generates Clue A in the following way.  
First, the computer draws one common error. This common error is randomly selected from a normal 
distribution with a mean 0 and a standard deviation 30. The chance of the common error being 0 is the 
highest. With approximately 67% chance, the error will be within one standard deviation (30) around 
the mean (0), that is, between ‐30 (0–30) and 30 (0+30). With approximately 95% chance, the error will 
be within two standard deviations (30×2=60) around the mean 0, that is, between ‐60 and 60. 
Second, the computer draws a private error for each participant independently. The private errors are 
also randomly selected from a normal distribution with mean 0, but the standard deviation is 5. The 
computer draws the two private errors independently. Thus, the private error for you is likely 
different from the private error for your partner. The chance of the private error being 0 is the highest. 
With approximately 67% chance, private errors will be within one standard deviation, i.e., between ‐5 
and 5.  With approximately 95% chance, private errors will be within two standard deviations, i.e., 
between ‐10 and 10.   
Third, the computer calculates Clue A by first adding the common error to Y and then adding individual 
specific private error.  
Your Clue A = Y + Common error A (std. dev. 30) + Your Private error A (std. dev. 5) 
Partner Clue A = Y + Common error A (std. dev. 30) + Partner Private error A (std. dev. 5) 
Note that the Clue A that you receive is likely different from the Clue A that your partner receives, 
because the private errors are different between you and your partner. 
Example of Clue A:  
Suppose Y drawn by the computer is 400. First, the computer draws a common error from the normal 
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 30. The computer adds this common error to Y to get 
Y’, therefore Y’ will be between 340 (400‐2x30) and 460 (400+2x30) with 95% chance. Suppose the 
common error is ‐25. Y’ =400‐25=375.  
Next the computer draws two private errors from the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 5. With 95% chance, the private errors drawn will be within two standard deviations, that is,  
‐10 and 10. The computer adds the private error to Y’ to get Clue A. Suppose the private error drawn for 
you is ‐3; the Clue A you receive will be 375‐3=372. Suppose the private error drawn for your partner is 
+5; the Clue A your partner receives will be 375+5=380.  
 
In this example, your clue A is 372 and your partner clue A is 380. The true Y is 400. Both clues are 
different from Y because of errors contained in the clues. Your clue A is different from your partner’s 
clue A because the private errors are different. However, the private error is relatively small, so your 
clue A and your partner clue A are not that far apart.  
The table below provides 10 examples of Clue As for a given Y. Please see how your clue is different 
from Y and different from your partner’s Clue A.  
Example of signal draws (Clue A) 
Y  Common Error  
(c) 
Your Private Error 
(p) 
Your partner's 
Private Error 
(p’) 
Your Clue A 
(Y+c+p) 
Your partner's 
Clue A 
(Y+c+p’) 
386  16  ‐1  ‐1  401  401 
620  39  ‐4  ‐1  655  658 
670  ‐8  4  ‐2  666  660 
120  1  7  8  128  129 
874  13  0  ‐6  887  881 
622  ‐12  1  3  611  613 
483  30  6  0  519  513 
627  9  ‐6  1  630  638 
189  64  ‐2  3  251  256 
342  ‐49  6  ‐1  299  292 
 
 
 
Clue B 
Clue B is generated in the same way as Clue A, except that the standard deviations of the errors are 
different. For Clue B, the standard deviation of the common error is 5, and the standard deviation of 
the private error is 30. The procedure to draw Clue B is the same as Clue A.  
Example of Clue B:  
Suppose Y drawn by the computer is 400. First, the computer draws a common error from the normal 
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 5. Suppose the common error is ‐8. Y’’=400‐8=392.  
Next the computer draws two private errors from the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 30. Suppose the private error drawn for you is ‐20; the Clue B you receive will be 392‐20=372. 
Suppose the private error drawn for your partner is +28; the Clue B your partner receives will be 
392+28=420.  
 
In this example, your clue B is 372 and your partner’s clue B is 420. The true Y is 400. Your clue B is 
different from your partner clue B because the private errors are different. Since the private error in 
clue B is relatively large compared to clue A, your clue B and your partner clue B are likely to differ more 
from each other than your clue A and your partner clue A.  
The table below provides 10 examples of Clue Bs for a given Y. Please see how your Clue B deviates from 
Y and from your partner’s Clue B. 
 
 
 
 
Example of signal draws (Clue B) 
Y  Common Error  
(c) 
Your Private Error 
(p) 
Your partner's 
Private Error 
(p’) 
Your Clue A 
(Y+c+p) 
Your partner's 
Clue A 
(Y+c+p’) 
386  ‐9  22  ‐6  399  371 
620  ‐8  14  ‐10  626  602 
670  1  ‐5  8  666  679 
120  6  40  4  166  130 
874  ‐1  9  12  882  885 
622  4  45  ‐13  671  613 
483  ‐1  7  ‐53  489  429 
627  9  2  ‐17  638  619 
189  2  24  63  215  254 
342  9  21  ‐7  372  344 
 
Clue Summary 
Each player has two clues about Y: Clue A and Clue B. The computer generates each clue independently 
by adding to Y two error terms, one common error and one private error.  
Your Clue A = Y + Common error A (std. dev. 30) + Private error A (std. dev. 5) 
Your Clue B = Y + Common error B (std. dev. 5) + Private error B (std. dev. 30) 
On average, you expect the size of the total error including common and private errors to be the same 
for Clue A and Clue B.  Thus, you expect both clues to be equally informative about the unknown 
number Y.  
Similarly, the computer generates two clues about Y for your partner.  
Partner Clue A = Y + Common error A (std. dev. 30) + Partner Private error A (std. dev. 5) 
Partner Clue B = Y + Common error B (std. dev. 5) + Partner Private error B (std. dev. 30). 
Both the Clue A and Clue B are most likely to be different between you and your partner, because 
private errors are independently drawn. Since the private errors for Clue B is more dispersed (standard 
error is 30) than the private errors for Clue A (standard error is 5), you expect to see that your Clue B 
and your partner’s Clue B are farther apart from each other than your Clue A and your Partner’s Clue 
A.   
After all participants submit their decisions for the guessing game, you will receive the feedback 
information including the Y, your partner’s clues, your partner’s guess, and your payoff.  
   
[Part 2] 
Your task is the same as Part I except that you have to now purchase the two clues at a cost. Clue A and 
Clue B are available to you only if you pay a cost to buy them. Before you play the guessing game, you 
have to decide whether you want to purchase the clues. If you buy one clue, you pay a cost of 5 francs. 
The cost is the same for Clue A and Clue B. If you buy both the clues, you pay a total cost of 10 francs. 
The costs are the same for you and your partner.  
You select among one of the 4 choices: buy none, buy only Clue A, buy only Clue B, or buy both clues. 
Similarly, your partner also has to decide whether to purchase clues at cost and choose among the 
above 4 choices. You and your partner make clue purchasing decisions simultaneously. After you and 
your partner submit clue purchasing decisions, you will be informed about each other’s clue purchasing 
decisions. The computer will send you the clues you purchased, and send your partner the clues he/she 
purchased. Finally, both of you make your decisions in the guessing game.  
After all participants submit their decisions for the guessing game, you will receive the feedback 
information including the Y, your partner’s clue purchase decision, the clues, your partner’s guess, and 
your payoff. 
   
 Quiz 
Q1. The random number Y is equally likely to be a number between 100 and 900. 
_____ True               _____ False 
Answer: F 
Q2. If the Y in the current round is 700, then Y in the next round is likely to be close to 700.  
_____ True              _____ False 
Answer: F 
Q3. Your clue A is the same as your partner’s clue A. Your clue B is the same as your partner’s clue B. 
_____ True             _____ False 
Answer: F 
Q4. The common error in Clue A is the same for both players, but the private errors are different for you 
and your partner.  
_____ True             _____ False 
Answer: T 
Q5. The common error for Clue A has mean of 0 and standard deviation of 30. On average, the error is 
expected to be 0. In 95% of cases, the error will be within two standard deviations. That is, the common 
error will be between ___________and ____________in 95% of cases. 
Answer: ‐60 and +60 
Q6. The common error for Clue B has mean of 0 and standard deviation of 5. On average, the error is 
expected to be 0. In 95% of cases, the error will be within two standard deviations. That is, the common 
error will be between ___________and ____________in 95% of cases. 
Answer: ‐10 and 10 
Q7. The computer draws the private errors for you and your partner independently. It is most likely that 
your private error is different from your partner’s private error.  
_____ True             _____ False 
Answer: T 
Q8. On average, you expect that Clue A and Clue B are equally informative about the true value Y. 
_____ True             _____ False 
Answer: T 
Q9. On average, you expect that your Clue A is closer to your partner’s Clue A than your Clue B to your 
partner’s Clue B because the private errors of Clue A have smaller dispersions than the private errors of 
Clue B.  
_____ True             _____ False 
Answer: T 
Q10: In Part 1, you are given Clue A and Clue B. Suppose that the true value of Y is 600 and that your 
partner’s guess is 650, how much is your payoff in francs if your guess is 640?_________ 
Answer: 3000‐0.8*(640‐600)^2‐0.2*(640‐650)^2  =3000‐0.8*1600‐0.2*100 = 1700. 
Q11. In part 2, you have the option to buy clues at a cost. How much do you have to pay to buy one 
clue?_______How much do you have to pay to buy two clues?______ 
Answer: 5; 10 
Q12: In part 2, suppose that the true value of Y is 600 and that your partner’s guess is 650, how much is 
your payoff in francs if your guess is 640 and you bought both clue A and B?_________ 
Answer: 3000‐0.8*(640‐600)^2‐0.2*(640‐650)^2 – 10 =3000‐0.8*1600‐0.2*100 – 10 = 1690. 
Q13. In part 2, you are not able to know which clues your partner has purchased before you submit your 
guess. 
_____ True             _____ False 
Answer: F 
 
  
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Major_____ 
Age_____ 
Gender_____ 
 
 
 
 
 
1. In Part 1, you are given two clues. How did you use the two clues? Did you use both 
clues in the same way or differently? 
 
 
2. In Part 2, you have options to buy two clues. How did you make the clue-buying 
decisions? Did your clue-buying decision change over time after you saw other players’ 
decision (e.g., other players’ clue-buying decisions and guessing decisions)? 
 
 
 
3. In Part 2, how did you use the clue or clues you buy to make your decisions in the 
guessing game? 
 
 
 
 
4. Were the instructions clear? If not, which parts were not clear?   
 
(A) Stage 1 (exogenous information)
(B) Stage 2 (endogenous information)
Figure 3: Screenshots of two stages of the game.
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